

Swedish Security Service
2009



An Organisation in Constant Change – Anders Danielsson gives his view of the Swedish Security Service

The year 2009 marked the twentieth anniversary of the establishment of the Swedish Security Service in its present and more independent form. This coincided with the Berlin Wall coming down and the end of the Cold War. Great changes in the world around us certainly presented a number of challenges for a security service. Now – twenty years later – we face completely different challenges. The saying that we live in a changing world may be a hackneyed phrase, but during the 21st century the pace of change in the area of security has increased. Not only must we live with but also teach ourselves to manage complexity, ambiguity and sudden changes.

The task of the Swedish Security Service is to protect Sweden and democracy. This is a noble and important task. Should we fail, this might have considerable consequences for Sweden and its citizens. The Service must therefore have the ability to keep track of what is happening in the world. We must also be flexible and able to adapt quickly to new circumstances.

We know that other countries conduct intelligence activities against Sweden and Swedish



Anders Danielsson is Head of the Swedish Security Service.

interests, that there are people who commit politically motivated crimes, and that people with connections in serious organised crime subject public officials and journalists to unlawful pressure. We also know that there are people in Sweden who plan, support or finance terrorist activities in other countries. These are known facts – and our task is to prevent such crimes as well as expose the players behind them.

Each year presents its own challenges. In 2009, Sweden's EU presidency involved the work of many colleagues in the Service and placed a heavy demand on our resources. At the same time, the protection of those in central government was one of the activities given priority during the year, as was our task to counter terrorism in Sweden and abroad.

Tomorrow presents its own challenges too. In order to meet these, we need to look forward. One trend we see is electronic attacks becoming ever more targeted and well thought out. It is not just lone hackers who devote themselves to this but also criminal gangs and

state-sponsored players with considerable resources. Electronic attacks can be used to gain access to information not meant to be shared. They can also be used to sabotage critical infrastructure, such as the electricity supply or air traffic control, actions which could have considerable consequences for society. Developments in IT also lead to fresh demands and create new conditions for our work, as they enable on-line contact between various potential attackers who can then plan attacks without meeting in person.

Our work is not only to combat threats but also, in equal measure, to reduce vulnerabilities and thereby increase protection. For example, preventing electronic attacks is complicated as it can be difficult to identify those behind them. The Security Service therefore has an important responsibility to help bring about better protection for key functions of society. As regards crime which may have consequences for national security, the Service has a clear responsibility in the case of electronic attacks. We must therefore interact with other segments of Swedish society and the rest of



the world. Collaboration is crucial if we are to fulfil our remit, which is why we actively engage in dialogue with public agencies, trade and industry and civil society.

During 2009 the Security Service initiated a long-term project to develop both its organisation and its working methods. This also includes further development in the areas of steering and management so as to pave the way for a new organisation. All this serves to make us better equipped to meet future demands, and to fulfil our remit more effectively. We are to become even better at protecting Sweden and

democracy, and we shall do this by basing our actions on the rule of law and respect for privacy and human rights.

A handwritten signature in black ink, which appears to read "Anders Danielsson".

Anders Danielsson
Director General

About the Swedish Security Service

The Swedish Security Service protects Sweden's democratic system, the rights and freedoms of our citizens and national security. We do this by preventing and detecting offences against national security, countering terrorism and protecting central government.

We engage in five main areas of activity:

Counter-espionage, which refers to the prevention and detection of espionage and other unlawful intelligence activities targeting Sweden and Swedish interests abroad, as well as foreign interests in Sweden, including espionage targeting refugees.

Counter-terrorism, which refers to the prevention and detection of terrorism targeting Sweden or foreign interests in our country, acts of terrorism in other countries, the existence of international terrorist networks in Sweden, and the supporting and financing of terrorist activities.

Protection of the Constitution, which refers to the protection of Sweden's domestic security. This is done by preventing and detecting activities which, by use of violence, threat or force, seek to alter Sweden's democratic form of government, unlawfully influence the

decision-making process of authorities or political bodies, or prevent citizens from exercising their constitutional rights and freedoms.

Protective security, which involves advising and inspecting public agencies and companies in the interest of preventing terrorism and protecting critical national assets. This includes performing records checks following requests from the public agencies concerned.

Dignitary protection, which refers to protection and security work relating to central government, the Royal Family, foreign diplomatic representatives, and state visits and similar events.

In addition to this, the Service engages in efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Our primary task is to prevent knowledge, products, substances and micro-organisms leaving or transiting Sweden and reaching players seeking to acquire or


further develop weapons of mass destruction or their carriers. In this matter we work closely with other public agencies.

The Service also provides support to other police authorities in certain areas. Our Bomb Data Centre collects, analyses and disseminates information to other law-enforcement agencies. The Service also provides technical equipment for secret wire-tapping, and operates a technical media laboratory for all kinds of media processing.

Our organisation

The Security Service has a three-tier structure, with a management tier, a departmental tier and an operational tier. The Management is made up of the Director General, his Deputy, the Head of the Secretariat and four Heads of Department. The four departments – Security Intelligence, Security Measures, Support Functions and Local Operations – are made up of eighteen units in total. Each department comes under a Head of Department supported by a management group consisting of a head of each unit. In addition, the

Organisation of the Swedish Security Service



This chart shows the organisation as of 31 December 2009. Ongoing organisational developments will result in changes to come into effect on 1 January 2011.



Management is supported by a Secretariat made up of five functions. The Secretariat comes under the Head of the Secretariat and that person's management group.

Employees of different backgrounds


There are around 1,000 people working in the Security Service, most of them in Stockholm, although we also have regional units in Umeå, Uppsala, Örebro, Göteborg and Malmö (cf. p. 17). We have employees from many professions, including analysts, case officers, technicians, interpreters, close protection officers, lawyers, surveillance officers, economists, investigators, administrators and translators. 36 percent of our employees are women, and some 53 percent of our staff has received police training.

Security cases in 2009

The Security Service reviewed around 680 of the 24,200 asylum applications made in 2009. Of these, 69 were reviewed in depth. We recommended to the Migration Board that 6 of these applications be refused.

We also reviewed around 1,800 of the 26,000 citizenship applications processed by the Migration Board in 2009. In 107 of these cases a more in-depth review was carried out, usually including an interview with the applicant. We recommended refusal in 4 citizenship cases.

Security Service costs per area of activity in 2009, in percentages



In recent years, our main priorities have been the protection of central government and the fight against terrorism.

Our areas of activity

The crimes which the Security Service is tasked to prevent and detect can have considerable consequences for society and its private citizens. Being proactive – i.e. preventing crime being committed at all – is therefore of utmost importance.

Counter-espionage

The Security Service works to prevent and detect espionage and other unlawful activities targeting Swedish interests in Sweden and abroad as well as foreign interests in our country. We also work to prevent and detect unlawful intelligence activities targeting groups in exile and dissidents.

Sweden and Swedish interests are the targets of ongoing, long-term and systematic intelligence activities. Other countries have intelligence officers posted here. Some of these officers are declared as such; they conduct lawful intelligence activities and we cooperate with them. However, other intelligence officers are in Sweden under false pretences, claiming to be diplomats, journalists, businessmen, etc. These persons conduct unlawful intelligence activities; in other words, they try to obtain classified information that could prejudice national security or damage Sweden in for instance international negotiations.

Intelligence officers often use other people to obtain classified information from authorities or companies. Persons attempting to obtain classified information for the purpose of handing it over to foreign powers are guilty of espionage. We work continuously to prevent such activities. This involves intelligence work, continuous monitoring of critical assets and advice and information to public agencies and companies handling classified information.

Counter-espionage also involves preventing and detecting espionage against Swedish companies when orchestrated by another state to gain access to information potentially harmful to Swedish interests or national security. In situations when a company spies on another company to gain a competitive advantage, this constitutes a crime to be investigated by local police authorities.



Counter-terrorism

The Service is responsible for countering terrorism in Sweden. We work to prevent attacks in Sweden and against Swedish interests abroad. It should not be possible to plan or support terrorist attacks from Sweden.

There are currently individuals in Sweden who sympathise with and directly support terrorist activities in various parts of the world. There are also individuals who travel abroad to take part in training for terrorism or unlawful acts of violence. The Service therefore works to prevent Sweden from being used as a base for recruitment, logistic support, financing or planning of attacks, and to prevent Swedes from taking part in terrorism abroad. This preventive work consists primarily of open dialogue with other agencies and other important partners. Intelligence activities are also part of our work. Since terrorism is not an area constrained by geographical or national boundaries, we are dependent on cooperation with others, both nationally and internationally, in this respect.

We also work with the Migration Board to prevent foreign nationals associated with terrorist networks from entering Sweden or gaining residency or citizenship.

Protection of the Constitution

The Security Service works to prevent offences against Sweden's domestic security. We do this by preventing and detecting illegal activities which seek by way of violence, threat or force to alter our democratic form of government, influence decision-making politicians or officials, influence the work of journalists or prevent citizens from exercising their constitutional rights and freedoms. The Service therefore works to counter unlawful pressure targeting free speech, political decisions and their enforcement. This concerns specifically offences committed against elected representatives, public officials and journalists in the exercise of their profession, and the constitutional rights and freedoms of citizens.

In 2009, the Security Service's government funding amounted to SEK 916 million.

46,742 documents were registered with the Security Service in 2009.

In 2009, the Security Service carried out 68,114 records checks.

237 people requested information from the Security Service's central register in 2009. 88 of these received all or part of the information requested. In cases where information was not released, this was either because the person was not present in the register or because the information was confidential.

Only unlawful pressure from those known as high-capacity actors is judged to constitute a threat to the domestic security of the state. High-capacity actors are those posing a threat and having the ability and intention to harm a function such as the editing team on a news desk or a public agency rather than a private individual. Today there are both financially and politically motivated high-capacity actors, and the Service works to prevent unlawful pressure from these; that is to say, from both the far left and the far right as well as from serious organised crime.

Protective security

The Security Service works to increase the level of security in society. We do this through advice and inspection of public agencies and companies covered by protective security legislation. In this way, we help to protect national security and prevent terrorism.

Advice is given mainly in connection with visits to public agencies and companies, in the form of dialogue with management representatives and heads of security. By providing information and training we help maintain security awareness among the staff. We also issue directions on how the legislation is to be applied. We publish information material and run annual courses for staff working in

the area of protective security. The Service also has an oversight function in this area. This means that we have to check that the protective security measures taken by public agencies and certain companies are adequate in relation to the activities carried out. We visit the agencies and companies to inspect the state of their protective measures. Protective security refers to physical protection, information and IT security, and the suitability of staff and their security awareness. We also offer advice to remedy any flaws and, if necessary, a repeat inspection is scheduled to be carried out one or two years later.

Our commitment to protective security also includes performing records checks. These form part of security screening procedures carried out by other public agencies, and form a basis for their decisions concerning employment. Such procedures serve to assess whether a person is suitable, loyal and reliable from a security perspective. The Service performs records checks following an application from a public agency and consent from the person to be checked. The person concerned is checked against the criminal record, the suspects record and the Security Service's central register.

Dignitary protection

The Security Service is responsible for the security of central government and for personal protection granted following a special decision by our Service. We are also responsible for security during state visits and similar events, and for the security of foreign diplomatic representatives when in Sweden. This responsibility involves making risk and threat assessments and taking suitable protective measures based on these assessments. In this task, we work with the police authorities, the Government Offices, the Parliament, the Royal Court, foreign embassies in Sweden and security services in other countries. Central government in Sweden consists of around 400 persons: the Head of State, the Speaker, the Prime Minister, the Ministers, the State Secretaries and the MPs. To ensure that these people are safe and also feel safe, our tailor-made security measures are continuously reviewed in relation to risks and threats in any given situation.



National remit calls for regional presence

As the Security Service has a nationwide remit we need to maintain equal capacity across Sweden.



We operate in the geographic locations considered most effective for carrying out our tasks. Certain types of activity are carried out at our headquarters in Stockholm, while others are carried out at our five regional units.

The regional units focus their work mainly on crime prevention. They engage primarily in intelligence gathering and basic protective security. Intelligence gathering is one part of the Service's crime prevention and detection work in the areas of counter-espionage, counter-terrorism and protection of the Constitution. Basic protective security work involves informing public agencies and certain companies on how to protect key functions of society and confidential information, and how these agencies and companies can protect themselves against terrorist attacks.

The regional units also participate in the protection of central government. When any of our protectees travel to another part of the country, the regional unit and the local police coordinate local protective measures in cases where a potential threat exists in regard to the person.

We work closely with other police authorities throughout the country.



(1) Regional Unit North is stationed in Umeå. It covers the counties of Västernorrland, Jämtland, Västerbotten and Norrbotten.


(2) Regional Unit Upper Central is stationed in Uppsala. It covers the counties of Uppsala, Gotland, Västmanland and Gävleborg.

(3) Regional Unit Lower Central has its head office in Örebro and a working group in Norrköping. It covers the counties of Jönköping, Södermanland, Östergötland, Värmland, Dalarna and Örebro.

(4) Regional Unit West is stationed in Göteborg. It covers the counties of Halland and Västra Götaland.

(5) Regional Unit South is stationed in Malmö. It covers the counties of Kronoberg, Kalmar, Blekinge and Skåne.

(6) The head office is located in Stockholm and is also responsible for the county of Stockholm.





Cooperation is important for getting results

The Security Service cooperates extensively on both a national and international level. The exchange of information and experience is a key feature in this cooperation. We support and receive help from others in various investigations and operations.

National cooperation

On a national level we cooperate primarily with other intelligence and law-enforcement agencies such as the Military Intelligence and Security Directorate (MUST), the National Defence Radio Establishment (FRA), the police authorities, the National Criminal Investigation Department and the Economic Crime Authority. This cooperation mainly takes the form of information and experience exchanges, but we also cooperate on an operational level. For example, we support the police authorities in their crime investigations by offering expert knowledge, threat assessments, surveillance and analyses. In the area of digital protection, we work closely with police authorities in the planning and implementation of various protective measures in their respective geographical areas.

We also cooperate with bodies covered by protective security legislation, i.e. government agencies, municipalities, county councils and

certain companies. In addition, we cooperate extensively with various organisations and communities. The Security Service convenes the Counter-Terrorism Cooperation Council, which works to increase Sweden's ability to counter terrorism. This council consists of thirteen Swedish government agencies: the Prosecution Authority, the Economic Crime Authority, the National Criminal Investigation Department, the Prison and Probation Service, the Radiation Safety Authority, the Migration Board, the Armed Forces, the National Defence Radio Establishment, the Civil Contingencies Agency, the Coast Guard, the Defence Research Agency, the Customs and the Security Service.

The development work undertaken by the Counter-Terrorism Cooperation Council is in line with EU and Swedish government strategies in that area and has included drawing up action plans with specific measures for strengthening co-operation among various agencies on terrorist-related issues. The

” Incidents abroad may influence national threat assessment.

Council also has a number of working groups connected to it.

One such, permanent, working group is the National Centre for Terrorist Threat Assessment (NCT) which makes both short-term and long-term strategic assessments of the terrorist threat to Sweden and Swedish interests. The NCT also produces analyses of terrorism-related incidents and developments in the surrounding world. The NCT is staffed by personnel from the Security Service, the Military Intelligence and Security Directorate (MUST) and the National Defence Radio Establishment (FRA). As of 2009, the offices of the NCT are co-located in Security Service premises.

International cooperation

Incidents abroad may have consequences in Sweden and may come to influence national threat assessment and security. For this reason, well-developed cooperation between our Service and the security and intelligence services of other countries is important. We

cooperate extensively on an international level, primarily with the Nordic and other European countries. We also cooperate with the US on a regular basis. Together, we work to counter international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

The exchange of information and experience is a key feature in this international cooperation, and the Security Service represents Sweden in a number of multinational bodies and cooperation groups. These include Europol, the Club of Berne, the Counter-Terrorism Group (CTG), The EU Terrorism Working Group (TWG) and the Police Working Group on Terrorism (PWGT).

Cooperation with other security and intelligence services also takes place within the framework of international requests for legal assistance. We support and receive help from other countries in various investigations and operations.



A security service works to raise the level of security in its own country, through activities such as advice and checks. The service also works to detect security threats against the country. The Security Service in Sweden, the FBI in the US, the BSS (MI5) in the UK and the FSB in Russia are all examples of security services.

An intelligence service is active in the gathering, processing and dissemination of information on other states, non-state actors and phenomena; information on which to base decisions on future action. Intelligence services gather information from open and secret sources. The CIA in the US, the SVR in Russia and the SIS (MI6) in the UK are examples of intelligence services.

Threats to Sweden

The Security Service closely monitors world developments and analyses the threats targeting Sweden and Swedish interests. Threats and vulnerabilities must be identified and assessed in order to safeguard national security and democracy. Our short and long-term assessments enable us to take measures, advise cooperation partners, and lay the foundations for long-term planning.

Terrorism in other countries is supported and financed from Sweden

When assessing the terrorist threat we distinguish between threats of attack and threats from facilitators. The former indicates that there are individuals or groups planning to carry out terrorist attacks. At present there is a low level of threat to Sweden and Swedish interests abroad. There is, however, a concrete threat from facilitators in Sweden. This means that there are a number of individuals who are planning, supporting or financing terrorist offences in other countries – and that they are doing so from our country. Sweden has a responsibility under international law to counter such terrorist offences. The threat from facilitators in Sweden comes mainly from Islamist terrorism, and their activities most often aim to support terrorist offences in conflict zones such as Iraq, Afghanistan and Somalia. Several persons associated with radical networks advocating violence have travelled from Sweden to conflict zones to participate in training associated with terrorism and illegal acts of violence.

Several countries spy on Sweden

More than fifteen countries are currently engaging in systematic intelligence activities in and against Sweden or against Swedish targets abroad. Their aim is often the illegal gathering of information on Swedish politics, economic issues, technology, science or defence, or on refugees in Sweden. State-sponsored players have also attempted to influence Sweden's political decision-making and to acquire Swedish companies or other strategically important establishments in order to gain access to information or technology.

This intelligence gathering ultimately serves to benefit the interests of these countries at the expense of Swedish interests. Some of these intelligence activities also serve to put Sweden in a position of dependence, so as to facilitate efforts to influence Sweden's actions. Countering the intelligence threat is thus a key factor in maintaining Sweden's political, economic and military freedom of action.

Electronic attacks are becoming increasingly professional

For our society to function, it is extremely important that the IT systems of Swedish public agencies and other key functions of society cannot be hacked into or manipulated. The trend shows that electronic attacks against such systems are becoming increasingly sophisticated and purposeful. Moreover, the knowledge and tools necessary to carry out electronic attacks have become commodities sold on illegal markets, for example, over the Internet.

Electronic attacks may be a method used by criminal individuals, networks and states. It is often very difficult afterwards to determine who has been behind an attack. This is due to a large extent on attacks being based on players jumping between servers physically located in different countries, which makes tracking them considerably more difficult from a technical as well as a legal perspective. Since it is difficult to assess the number and origin of these hackers, conducting intelligence activities that seek to counter them all is not productive. Instead, effective preventive counter-measures are the best way to increase protection of sensitive information. This is done for instance by offering advice on IT security to public agencies and other key functions of society.

Offences against politicians and officials are harmful to democracy

When politicians and officials are the target of threats and violence seeking to influence their decision-making, this undermines the foundations of our democracy. This also applies when representatives of freedom of speech – journalists, for instance – are similarly prevented from exercising this freedom. The Security Service therefore works to map and counter offences involving unlawful pressure. The criminal networks that may currently pose a threat in this respect are found mainly in serious organised crime and political extremist groups.

The threat from autonomous groups mainly targets political parties perceived as xenophobic and public agencies and organisations who handle issues viewed as significant in ideological terms, such as those regarding migration and integration. The various groups in the far right so-called White Power movement mainly pose a threat to their ideological opponents in the far left so-called autonomous movement, but also occasionally subject other targets to unlawful pressure. Persons involved in serious organised crime also commit crimes potentially harmful to democracy. It is primarily those working in the judicial system who are affected by this type of crime, which takes the form of threats and harassment as well as relatively serious violent crime.



Imprisonment for spying on individuals of Uyghur origin

A Swedish citizen of Uyghur origin, prosecuted in late 2009, was in March 2010 sentenced to one year and four months' imprisonment for aggravated unlawful intelligence activities. Over a number of years, he had been gathering information on his former countrymen on behalf of the Chinese intelligence service.

From January 2008, the convicted man had gathered information on individuals from a Uyghur background in Sweden, Norway, Germany and the US. He had passed these details on to a Chinese diplomat and a Chinese journalist who were working in Sweden on behalf of the Chinese intelligence service. This was judged by Stockholm City Court to be an aggravated crime, since it had been carried out in a systematic way, had lasted some considerable time and may have caused or could cause serious harm to a large number of people. Another reason for this judgement was that the intelligence service in question was working under the orders of a great power which does not fully respect human rights and which also has the resources to carry out its policies.


A crime difficult to prove

Spying on refugees is a common form of unlawful intelligence activity; a crime difficult to prove. The Security Service knows that there are some fifteen countries which devote considerable resources to mapping and persecuting exiled regime opponents living in


Sweden. Threats and acts of reprisal against family members in these persons' home countries are used to put pressure on the targeted individual in order to put an end to their oppositional activities.

Low range of penalties

This case reopened the debate on the penalties for unlawful intelligence activity. It is a crime which carries a relatively low penalty, normally fines or imprisonment for up to one year. In the case of aggravated crime, the penalty can be anything from six months to four years in prison. The Security Service considers the range of penalties too low given the serious nature of the crime, which targets individuals who have fled from their homeland and sought asylum in Sweden. Being the target of this type of espionage has considerable consequences for both the individual and their friends and relatives living in the homeland. In April 2010, the Government appointed an inquiry to assess whether the current legislation is adequate. This inquiry is to be completed in April 2012.



In China, most Uyghurs live in the north-western province of Xinjiang, where at present they constitute a minority. Following the unrest that took place in Xinjiang during the summer of 2009, at least nine people have been executed, and there are reports that several hundred have disappeared or been imprisoned.



Identifying critical assets as a means to protect against espionage

A proactive approach is an important part of our work in preventing and detecting espionage and unlawful intelligence activities. One of the methods used is called reverse targeting. This method focuses on the target; the critical asset, rather than on the instigator.

When another country's intelligence service attempts to identify targets in Sweden believed to offer access to interesting information, this is known as targeting. Reverse targeting involves the opposite procedure, whereby the Security Service identifies critical assets in Swedish society that could be of interest to intelligence services of other countries. We help reduce the vulnerability of these assets by building contact networks and providing information on intelligence threats and on the risks associated with being the target of espionage or unlawful intelligence activities.

Experience shows that wherever we use reverse targeting we receive indications of ongoing un-

lawful intelligence activity. By using this method, we have increased awareness and knowledge within the critical assets identified in Sweden.

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During 2009, protection of those involved in the work of the Swedish EU Presidency was a high priority for the Security Service. One of the methods we used was reverse targeting in parts of the Government Offices. Anneli is one of our colleagues involved in reverse targeting:

“We gave lectures to staff in selected parts of the Government Offices and described scenarios such as where the intelligence threat came from, which areas risked targeting and how staff might be affected.

During this past year, we have also used reverse targeting at universities, colleges, companies who work in the area of military technology, and public agencies whose work might be of interest to intelligence services of other countries.”

Critical assets could include details about central government that may be used to Sweden's detriment in its negotiations with other states.



Reducing intelligence activities targeting the EU presidency

Before and during the autumn of 2009, the Security Service monitored developments in Sweden and other countries which could result in intelligence activities with a bearing on the Swedish EU presidency. We believe that the role we played had a restraining effect on the intelligence activities of several countries.

All countries which hold the EU presidency are of particular interest to those gathering intelligence. Also under normal circumstances, intelligence services of other countries take an interest in the areas given priority by the Government during its EU presidency, such as energy, growth and the further enlargement of the EU.

Aims and objectives of the anticipated intelligence threat

In view of the Swedish EU presidency, the Service carried out a comprehensive assessment of the anticipated intelligence threat. We believed that this threat might involve:

- mapping the preparations for and the individuals involved in organising the work of the presidency,
- attempting to acquire sensitive information from these individuals or to recruit them, and
- attempting to gain unauthorised access to computer systems and to wire-tap for instance mobile phones.

We also believed that the aims of such unlawful intelligence activities during the tenure of the Swedish EU presidency might be:

- to acquire knowledge about the positions adopted by Sweden and the EU on particular issues,
- to influence the EU's decision-making process and thereby gain political, economic or military advantages, and
- to influence EU policy and create discord between member states.

Information and technical support

The Government and the public agencies concerned were presented with the Service's assessment in view of the presidency. We also provided the Government Offices with technical support in order to prevent sensitive information from being leaked. By taking these counter-measures, we believe that we reduced the opportunities for intelligence services of several countries to conduct any unlawful intelligence activities, both before and during the tenure of the Swedish EU presidency.

Intelligence activities involve gathering and processing information in order to use that information for a specific purpose. Such activities are not unlawful *per se*.

Intelligence activities become unlawful when someone on behalf of a foreign power acquires information which can bring harm to another state's security when made known. This can also be the case when a person on behalf of a foreign power acquires information about other people's personal circumstances. Such intelligence activities may involve a foreign power using persons who have or who can gain access to information needed by that foreign power. Read more about how such a person can be recruited on p. 28.

Espionage is the attempt to gain access to information potentially detrimental to national security, in order to pass it on to a foreign power.

How to recruit an agent

When a person acquires confidential information in Sweden on behalf of another country, this may constitute unlawful intelligence activity or espionage. It can be carried out by both foreign intelligence officers and Swedish agents. The highest priority for an intelligence officer on his mission is to recruit agents who can supply information. Potential agents are put through a systematic process which can be divided into six stages.

The recruitment process begins with the foreign intelligence service identifying its *intelligence requirement*.

This then constitutes the basis for the *targeting* stage, when an intelligence officer is tasked with finding a person who can supply the required information.

The person whom the intelligence officer judges to have access to the right information is then studied during the *observation* stage. Details of personal qualities, weaknesses, financial and family situation form the basis for an assessment of the possibilities of getting that person to work for another country.

If the intelligence officer judges that the person selected is suitable, he or she seeks contact in the *approach* stage. This approach happens in a way that must be seen as spontaneous and by chance, although in actual fact contact is made on the basis of the information which has been acquired in the observation stage.


If the first meeting is successful, the intelligence officer then embarks on a relationship with the intended agent in the *cultivation* stage. The selected person is subjected to a charm offensive and is given innocent tasks in order to test the relationship. Vigilance and judgment are broken down over what is sometimes a period of years.

Finally, the intelligence officer asks the intended agent to pass on confidential or sensitive information. The *recruitment* stage is the hardest moment in the process, but, should it work out well for the intelligence officer, this person will then become an agent for another country's intelligence service.

An intelligence officer is a specially trained representative for a country's intelligence service. Some fifteen countries have stationed intelligence personnel in Sweden, and a handful of countries have personnel who travel to Sweden on specific missions. Several of these countries have declared their intelligence personnel, which means that the Security Service knows of these individuals. If an intelligence officer is not declared, he or she may act under cover as a diplomat, journalist or visiting researcher.

An agent is recruited by an intelligence officer because he or she has or can gain access to confidential information of interest to the intelligence officer. The agent might be, for example, an employee or consultant involved in a security sensitive activity in a Swedish company, a researcher at a Swedish university, or an employee in the Swedish Police or Armed Forces. An agent is often called a spy.

RECRUITMENT – A PROCESS IN SIX STAGES




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What do I do if I believe that I am the target of a recruitment attempt? Fredrik, a Security Service employee, who works in counter-espionage, recommends the following:

“You should make a note of who contacted you, and the reason they gave for doing so. Also make a note of when and how the first contact took place. Then contact the Security Service.”

It is during the targeting stage that the intelligence officer selects a person with access to the information required.





Knowledge and control prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

The Security Service has taken a number of measures to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Over the past year, we have participated in a joint operation with export control authorities in several European countries aimed at controlling exports to Iran and North Korea. We have also visited trade fairs and conferences to give lectures on current legislation and export licensing.

One of the most important ways to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is visiting companies and research institutes which have products or knowledge of significance to the development of such weapons. As this often concerns dual-use products, companies are not always aware that they produce something that could be of interest in the development of weapons of mass destruction. In order to reach many companies in one go, we have visited trade fairs and given lectures at conferences together with the Agency for Non-Proliferation and Export Controls. In our lectures we provide information on current legislation and the importance of applying for an export licence.

Working together with prevention

Sweden enjoys a high level of technology in both civil and military industry. As a result, players who intend to develop weapons of mass destruction try to acquire knowledge or products from Sweden. Some of these products may not be exported outside the EU without a licence. Knowledge transfer may also be regulated by law in some cases.

In non-proliferation issues, the Security Service works closely with bodies such as the Customs, the Agency for Non-Proliferation and Export Controls, the Defence Research Agency, the Radiation Safety Authority and the Armed Forces. We also take part in international efforts to prevent the export of knowledge and products from or via Sweden to players who wish to develop or improve weapons of mass destruction.

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“When we contact a company in our efforts to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction this does not mean that that company is suspected of any crime.” This emphatic comment is made by Eva, who works in the area of non-proliferation.

“We wish to provide information on legislation and modes of acquisition so that they can see whether a purchaser is trying to circumvent our export control legislation. In general terms, there is a broad understanding among Swedish companies on these issues.”

Weapons of mass destruction are nuclear weapons, biological and chemical weapons, and weapons carriers such as cruise missiles.

Dual-use products can be used both for manufacturing totally ordinary civilian products and for producing weapons of mass destruction. Valves, vacuum pumps, heat exchangers and machine tools are examples of products which can have dual-use applications.

Swedes aid terrorism in Somalia

In 2009, some ten Swedes underwent training with the armed Islamist organisation al-Shabaab in Somalia. They are believed to have received both ideological and military training. These individuals, from different backgrounds, were all young and in most cases travelled to Somalia without telling their families.

These young Swedes were inspired by al-Shabaab's rhetoric which glorifies violence and descriptions of the conflict in Somalia as a part of al-Qaida's global war. The Security Service believes that Swedish returnees from al-Shabaab training camps may have been one source of inspiration. Such returnees are also thought to play a key role in various activities in Sweden in support of al-Shabaab.

The number of volunteers travelling to Somalia from other countries to join al-Shabaab has increased over the past two years. In Sweden, the Security Service has noted a continued interest on the part of a limited number of individuals to travel to Somalia and take part in training connected to acts of terrorism or unlawful violence. This can be seen as a consequence of the movement increasing its capacity to train foreigners and spread propaganda directed at people outside Somalia.

Threats to Horn of Africa and Sweden

Not only does this type of travel bring about tragedy for many families in Sweden – through the disappearance and in the worst case death of these young people – it also constitutes a serious security threat in the Horn of Africa region. The Security Service has a responsibility to prevent Sweden from being used as a base for recruiting persons to engage in terrorism, regardless of where such acts of terrorism take place.

The fact that Swedes acquire experience and training in carrying out attacks against civilians may also constitute a threat against Sweden. These Swedes may be considered a potential threat should they become intent on committing acts of violence in Sweden. They may, above all, contribute to increase the threat to Sweden by inspiring others to engage in violence-promoting Islamist extremism or otherwise contribute to activities supporting terrorism.

al-Shabaab has claimed responsibility for a number of terrorist attacks – including suicide bombings – directed at civilian targets in Somalia. In statements from al-Shabaab representatives, these attacks have been justified by referring to the same ideology as that advocated by al-Qaida.

Up to now, at least twenty individuals have travelled from Sweden to Somalia to take part in training connected to terrorist activities or unlawful acts of violence. According to our intelligence, four identified Swedes have been killed in fighting.

al-Shabaab uses violence in order to assume power in Somalia. They wish to set up a form of government based on a very strict interpretation of Islam, and to incorporate Somali areas in neighbouring countries into this state.



Preventive efforts to counter violence-promoting extremism

Countering the spread of violence-promoting ideologies remains a key feature of our work. We do this as part of society's efforts to help individuals leave violence-promoting extremist groups. Prevention is absolutely crucial. We monitor both far right and far left movements, as well as all types of extremism motivated by nationalism, separatism and violence-promoting Islamism. As a crime-fighting agency, we focus on the subjects' criminal behaviour, not their ideology, beliefs or faith.

Every year, people are drawn to violence-promoting extremism in both Sweden and the rest of Europe. Young people – both singly and in small groups – may develop an interest in politically or ideologically motivated violence. People are also sometimes recruited to extre-

mist groups as a result of coming into contact with established violence-promoting individuals and networks.

The risk of security-threatening activities both in Sweden and abroad increases with the number of violence-promoting individuals. It is therefore crucial to prevent young people from adopting violence-promoting ideologies and being recruited into groups and networks which use, promote or advocate violence. The earlier such measures are put in place, the greater their effect. This preventative work is best done in cooperation with different stakeholders. The Security Service therefore engages in dialogue with private individuals as well as community police, schools and associations.

The community police enjoy good relations with local residents.



Convictions for assault on the Sweden Democrats' press secretary and his partner

The press secretary of the far right Sweden Democrats and his partner were assaulted by members of the far left autonomous movement. The Security Service assisted in the criminal investigation by identifying the attackers who were later given prison sentences.

Late in the night of 6 June 2009, the Sweden Democrats' press secretary and his partner were attacked at Gullmarsplan in south Stockholm. The serious assault was preceded by a planned operation, whereby the attackers used surveillance groups and information networks which communicated via text messages. Three individuals were arrested and later sentenced to imprisonment between ten and twenty months for the assault and battery of the press secretary's partner.

Fears of tumultuous weekend

The assault took place over a weekend expected by the police to be tumultuous in places. Sweden's National Day, 6 June, is a day which in recent years has been marked by rallies organised by extremist groups, often resulting in disturbances of public order. It was also the day of a football match between Sweden and Denmark, and the day of elections to the European Parliament. Because of the elections, several parties held open-air rallies and election night parties.

Several incidents during the EU election campaign and the fact that networks within the autonomous movement systematically commit crimes against elected representatives, primarily those representing the Sweden Democrats, made us suspect that offences against civil liberty would be committed over that weekend. The Security Service therefore carried out an intensive intelligence operation during those particular days, and a couple of attacks were thereby averted. Even though the above assault could not be prevented, we were able to assist in the criminal investigation by providing background information, such as the ideological affiliation and criminal behaviour of the individuals arrested. We also assisted in identifying those later sentenced for the assault.

Offences against civil liberty involve preventing others by way of unlawful threats or unlawful force from exercising their democratic rights and freedoms, such as the freedom of expression.



The weekend of the assault also marked Sweden's National Day, an international football match between Sweden and Denmark, and the elections to the European Parliament. Police feared disorder in several parts of Stockholm, as previous National Day rallies organised by extremist groups had often resulted in disturbances of public order.

Police attacked by autonomous activists at Davis Cup match

One of the biggest police mobilisations ever in Sweden was that in connection with the Davis Cup in Malmö. Before the tennis tournament began, the Security Service assessed that the level of threat was high. Together with the Skåne County Police, we therefore worked to ensure that the demonstrations surrounding the event would pass off peacefully.

An intensive intelligence operation and close cooperation with the Skåne Police helped prevent a number of crimes being committed. Despite these efforts, some wilful damage was caused, and demonstrators outside the Baltiska Hallen arena in Malmö attacked the police. A number of people were arrested on the spot, and afterwards we were able to assist in identifying a further eighteen individuals and see them brought to court.

Two groups of demonstrators

During the period of 6 to 8 March 2009, Sweden played against Israel in the Davis Cup in the Baltiska Hallen in Malmö. Two different factions opposed the event. One was *Stop the Match*, made up of organisations and associations wishing to stop the match by

peaceful means. The other was *It's us who Decide*, which consisted of organisations and groups keener to promote violence and who wished to prevent the match from going ahead at any cost. The protests against the match were the culmination of protests against Israel, which had begun in December 2008 and which also came to include protests against police operations in Rosengård, a residential area in Malmö, in the same month.

Around 6,000 people took part in the demonstration on 7 March, of which a good hundred or so belonged to the autonomous movement. Over forty police reports were filed regarding cases which included violent riot, disturbances of public order, unlawful threats, unlawful trespass and assault.

Demonstrators attacked the police at the Baltiska Hallen in Malmö, using for instance paving stones. The violence was initiated by about twenty activists on what appears to have been a given signal.





Unlawful pressure in the form of threats, harassment and violence

Threats, harassment and violence are used to influence public agencies in their decision-making, journalists in their work, and the rights and freedoms of politicians and private individuals. When such crimes are committed in an organised and systematic manner, they have the potential to inflict serious harm on the Swedish democratic system. The Security Service therefore works actively to prevent this type of unlawful pressure.

In Sweden, such crimes are primarily committed by individuals and groups involved in serious organised crime or by extremist groups – White Power and the autonomous movement. They do this to achieve financial or political gain. Journalists and public officials are exposed to unlawful pressure from those in the extremist movements as well as from serious organised crime. The extremist movements also exert unlawful pressure on elected representatives and private individuals. It is not forbidden to belong to a certain organisation

Serious organised crime refers to networks or groups consisting of at least three individuals who commit serious crime for economic gain over a long period of time.

The autonomous movement consists of small groups of individuals and networks. This term covers several different ideological currents, but the common goal is a classless society with financial equality for all.

The White Power movement holds the view that the human race can be divided into different races, where the white race is superior. They also view the multicultural society as a threat to the survival of the white race.

or to have certain opinions, as the rights and freedoms granted by the Constitution entitles everyone to express and show their opinion. This right also applies to anti-democratic opinions, as long as the expression of these does not constitute agitating against a national or ethnic group, inciting rebellion, etc. What the Security Service is working to prevent and detect is therefore not extremist opinions but criminal acts prompted by any such opinions.

Attacks on political opponents

The most common types of crime committed by extremists are unlawful threat, assault, violent riot and wilful damage. Attacks often target political opponents. The crimes are committed not only in connection with large rallies but also in smaller meetings or against individuals in their homes.

Not all activities carried out by the White Power and autonomous movements are criminal. Most activities are in the form of opinion-making or of a social nature. Also, not everyone with connections to extremist movements could imagine resorting to crime for the sake of their political views.

Violence is rarely used

Unlawful pressure exerted by those in serious organised crime is most often a reaction to measures taken by society. It is unusual for threats and harassment to develop into violence. However, the fact that violence is sometimes used is a serious problem as it strengthens the intimidation power of serious organised crime.

Those engaged in serious organised crime also use friendship corruption to acquire information. This type of unlawful pressure is targeted primarily at the police, and it has happened that police employees have passed on information relating to ongoing operations. Even though this type of unlawful pressure is quite unusual in Sweden, it may ultimately result in considerable harm to and less faith in the judicial system.

Police restraining demonstrators during the Salem March. The march is organised every year by the White Power movement, and virtually every year the autonomous movement tries to stop it.



Electronic espionage against public agencies and companies

Swedish public agencies and companies were hit by electronic espionage in January and February 2009, when unknown attackers sent fake emails with attachments containing malware to selected persons at management level.

In those cases where the recipients opened the attachment, malware was installed on their computers without their knowledge, and the attackers were able to steal information and/or remotely control the infected computers. The attackers had selected the recipients from a public register on managerial bodies available on the internet. The emails had been made to look as though they came from a management group colleague. Unlike in most similar incidents, these emails were written in correct Swedish.

Firewalls and antivirus software not always sufficient

It is currently very difficult to distinguish between legitimate and fake emails, as the

sender's address can easily be falsified. Organisations often believe that they are protected against this type of attack if they have firewalls and antivirus software installed. However, by adapting their online activities to those permitted by organisations, such as surfing, attackers are able to pass firewalls. By customising, adapting or repackaging malware, they are also able to avoid discovery by antivirus software.

A global electronic spy network, GhostNet, was uncovered in March 2009. The network had infiltrated at least 1,295 computers in 103 countries. Up to a third of the infiltrated computers belonged to ministers, embassies and international organisations.

Swedish public agencies and companies are at risk from electronic espionage. Fake emails are used to send malware with the aim of stealing information or remotely controlling a computer.



Swedish public agencies at constant risk from espionage

The Security Service monitors the development of new malware attack methods, and has found that the opportunity to carry out this type of attack still exists. Having analysed the attack on Swedish management groups at the beginning of 2009, and similar attacks, we have drawn conclusions as to how such attacks are carried out. This means that we are able to present recommendations on how or-

ganisations should protect themselves against different types of malware attack.

Our assessment is that Swedish public agencies and companies are constantly at risk from electronic espionage. The aim of the attackers is to steal information, for instance by having the recipients of emails unintentionally install malware on their computers by opening infected documents.

Malware is an umbrella term for codes containing functions for carrying out sabotage or stealing information. Types of malware include viruses, worms and trojans.

Information theft using malware – how does it work?

An attacker who learns of a vulnerability in a programme that handles documents, such as Microsoft Word, can create customised malware in order to exploit that vulnerability and infect the document. To the recipient, however, the document seems legitimate and safe, although it contains malware.

The attacker attaches the document to an email which is sent to the recipient in the hope that they will open the document. The attacker may also refer to a seemingly safe link. When the document or link is opened, the malware is installed, enabling the attacker to control the computer remotely.

The next stage is to steal information from the infected computer. This can be done by:

- copying saved documents,
- taking screen shots (copies of what is shown on the screen),
- intercepting information or network log-ins,
- eavesdropping through the computer microphone to hear what is happening in the room, and
- observing the user and their surroundings via the computer's webcam.



Adapting the Protective Security Act to modern society

When tasked by the Government to review the Protective Security Act, the Security Service found that the aim of the Act needs to be clarified, and that the Act needs to be adapted to the technology and information society of today.

In October 2009, we submitted our report to the Government, setting out the issues we felt needed addressing as part of a general review of the Act. The basic method of reducing the number of vulnerabilities in key functions of society is to introduce customised protective security measures. However, the nature of the critical assets and the threats faced by them have changed over time. The need for security solutions and the conditions for their implementation have also changed since the Protective Security Act came into force.

New technology – new threats

When the Protective Security Act was introduced nearly fifteen years ago, the risk of a large-scale war between power blocks in Europe was still regarded as the main threat to Sweden. Current threats possibly having consequences for security policy are assessed to include espionage targeting central government and Swedish public agencies, as well as terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

When current legislation was introduced, computers were primary used for documentation. Today, computers have many other applications, such as financial services, communication (internet or telephony) and the remote control of systems (such as electricity and water supply). At the same time, the fact that critical functions of society are increasingly IT dependent makes today's society more vulnerable than it has ever been before. One relatively new phenomenon is that disruptions to crucial IT systems can have rapid and significant consequences for society.

Protective security means that public agencies and other bodies who come under protective security legislation must take preventive measures in order to protect against crime which may be a threat to national security, such as espionage and sabotage, and to protect against terrorism.

The hydroelectric power station in Jokkmokk produces some of Sweden's electricity.



Items of public information may become confidential when put together

Different types of information that is not in itself confidential may become so when put together in a database, for example, and may then become of significance to national security. This was highlighted when a government organisation asked the Security Service for advice in connection with putting an IT system into operation.



Electricity networks are a vital part of Sweden's infrastructure.

The IT system in question was set up to process information on critical infrastructure, such as electricity and communication networks. Together with this organisation, we judged that the system contained so much security sensitive information that great damage could be caused should it be disclosed and end up in the wrong hands.

There were several flaws in how the organisation had managed the work carried out on its IT system, and a number of fundamental protective security measures had never been taken. Above all, it had been difficult for them to assess to what extent the database actually contained security sensitive information. A set of measures drawn up by our Service enabled them to introduce a number of changes, with a view to limiting the spread of the information and protecting it.

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Katrin is one of the protective security officers who provided support to the organisation in its efforts to assess how security sensitive the information in its IT system was.

“The biggest challenge was identifying measures to help protect this information without hindering the day-to-day activities of the organisation. Protective measures should keep unauthorised people out yet not prevent anyone from doing their job. Most importantly, personnel who have authorised access to an IT system must be made aware of how security sensitive the information they handle is, and how it should best be dealt with.”

Security chauffeurs – a new concept for secure transport

In 2009, the Security Service introduced a new security concept as part of our dignitary protection: security chauffeurs. This new concept has enhanced the protection of central government, and has also enabled us to use our other protective methods more effectively.

Security chauffeurs are used in situations where persons whose protection we are responsible for need safe and secure transport but not close protection. The chauffeurs are used when we do not consider ordinary modes of transport such as the train, bus or taxi to be sufficiently secure.

Security chauffeurs, in contrast to our close protection officers, are not trained police officers, but have received similar training in areas such as driving, emergency medical assistance, conflict management and security awareness. Their vehicles have been adapted to provide better protection and instant communication with close protection officers or police.

The use of security chauffeurs has enhanced the protection of central government in several ways. Not only have a large number of transports become more secure, the introduc-

tion of these chauffeurs has also helped bring about more effective use of other protective methods. Some of the transports currently carried out by the security chauffeurs used to be carried out by close protection officers. By freeing up these resources, we are better able to meet the demand for close protection.

Improving our methods

The Services's dignitary protection work has undergone a comprehensive review in recent years. We have developed a three-step ladder, containing different protective measures for each step. After making a threat and risk assessment, we determine the level of protection and which protection measures should be applied.

Our ongoing efforts to develop and improve dignitary protection methods serve to create a safe and secure environment for our protectees.

Security chauffeurs are used when persons under our protection require safe transport. We are responsible for their safety and security until the transport has reached its destination; in this case when the person has arrived at work.



The European Development Days

Careful planning meant that the Security Service was able to balance the need for protection with that for openness on the European Development Days. The meeting, which took place during Sweden's tenure of the EU presidency, was held without any disturbances. Over a hundred people from the Security Service were involved in the efforts to create a safe and secure environment for participants at the meeting, which was the biggest dignitary protection operation organised by the Service in 2009.

The European Development Days are arranged on a yearly basis by the European Commission together with the country holding the EU presidency. Aiming to establish a dialogue on development and aid, the event is a meeting place for many different individuals, organisations and groups. The 2009 meeting took place in Stockholm on 22 to 24 October, and among the participants were a number of heads of state and government, Nobel prize winners, and leading figures in trade and industry and the arts. The meeting was also open to the public.

Over 6,000 people attended the meeting. To be able to balance the need for protection with that for openness, our efforts to provide dignitary protection required careful planning. The Security Service, the Stockholm Police and the Government Offices collaborated in the planning stages and worked closely together in order to achieve a high level of security surrounding the meeting.

Ensuring a safe and secure meeting

We began our work assessing the threat to the event far in advance. The level of protective measures to be taken was based on intelligence gathered both before and during the meeting.

We carried out security inspections of meeting places, residential homes, vehicles, etc. Uniformed police were on guard at airports, meeting places and other venues. We also assisted the organisers in the accrediting of participants, and a large number of escorted transports were undertaken in order to raise the level of protection surrounding certain delegates. Thirty people or so required close protection.

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William was the chief representative for the Security Service in the planning for the European Development Days.

“There were many interested parties involved in the planning for the European Development Days, and at the outset communications broke down. We set up an informal group to ensure that all the information we needed was available for comparison and assessment when we met.

As a group we came up with a set of common goals and ideas, and together we became very strong. It was a unique and successful way of working together, and also great fun. We are quite sure that this group will work together again in some other context.”

The President of the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso, attended the European Development Days in October 2009.





Do you have any questions?
Contact us via info@sakerhetspolisen.se
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